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1 Introduction
Public employment constitutes a significant fraction of employment. In 2013, the share of public
employment in total employment was, on average, 21% in OECD countries1. Hence, policies
regarding public sector wages and employment are likely to influence the labor market. The
objective of this study is to estimate the long-run labor market effects of public employment at
the city-level.
There is evidence from different countries indicating that governments use public employ-
ment as a policy tool to affect local labor market performance. Specifically, governments use
the distribution of public employment within their countries’ geography as a means to reduce
spatial economic inequalities. In 1992, up to 400,000 jobs in public works in East Germany cush-
ioned the rise in unemployment that followed re-unification (Kraus et al., 1998). In Spain, jobs in
public works have been created in rural and lagging areas as a means to increase local disposable
income (Jofre-Monseny, 2014). In Sweden, the creation of universities in less prosperous cities
has formed part of the country’s regional policy to reduce regional economic disparities (Ander-
sson, 2005). In England, 25,000 public sector jobs were relocated away from London between
2004 and 2010. Among other objectives, the policy aimed at stimulating economic activity in less
prosperous areas (Faggio and Overman, 2014). Less explicitly, interregional income redistribu-
tion has partly been achieved through a higher concentration of public sector jobs in the south,
both in Italy (Alesina et al., 2001) and in Spain (Marqués-Sevillano and Rosselló-Villallonga,
2004). Focusing on risk sharing between Norwegian regions, Borge and Matsen (2004) show
that public employment is a prominent force for counterbalancing local economic shocks.
Increasing the number of public employees in a city increases the demand for local services
such as housing, restaurants and hair-dressers, crowding-in private employment. However, this
effect may be offset by increases in local wages and prices that might follow the public em-
ployment expansion. This crowding-out effect can be particularly acute in the tradable sector
since local workers do not significantly affect the demand for locally produced manufactures.
In addition, local job creation can increase in-migration rates, which might also weaken the link
between more jobs in the local economy and a lower unemployment rate among its residents.
To quantify the long-run local labor market effects of public employment, we adopt two
quantitative approaches that we apply to the case of Spanish cities. In the first, we calibrate and
simulate a search and matching model with geographically mobile workers. In the second, we
resort to regression analysis. These two empirical approaches yield qualitatively similar results
and, thus, cross-check each other.
We first develop a 3-sector (public, tradable and non-tradable) search and matching model
à la Diamond (1982)-Mortensen (1982)-Pissarides (1985). The model assumes that (homoge-
neous) workers only search for work when are unemployed and that they accept any job offered.
1OECD (2015).
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Moreover, unemployed workers can move at zero cost. It is assumed that each city is sufficiently
small, implying a fixed reservation utility for the unemployed. Workers consume all their in-
come on a tradable good, a non-tradable good and land. The latter two prices are endogenous
and clear their respective markets while the price of the tradable good is exogenous and deter-
mined in the national (or international) market. Due to geographical mobility, a city whose labor
market prospects improve is a city that must become more expensive to live-in. Vacancies and
wages in the public sector are exogenously determined while, in the private sector, free-entry
means that firms in the tradable and non-tradable sectors open up vacancies until the expected
value becomes zero.
We characterize the steady state of the model, which we then calibrate to match the labor
market characteristics of the average Spanish city. Then, we use the model to simulate the lo-
cal labor market effects of expanding public sector employment. The geographical mobility of
workers implies that the labor force in the city increases with public sector job expansion. In
the non-tradable sector, the wage increase resulting from the policy is clearly offset by the rise
in local demand for the non-tradable good, and employment in this sector increases substan-
tially. In contrast, the demand for the locally produced tradable good remains unaffected. As
a result, the effect on tradable employment is small, being determined by two opposing forces:
higher wages, on the one hand, decrease employment, while agglomeration economies, on the
other, which boost productivity, increase employment. In our baseline calibration, one addi-
tional public sector job increases private jobs by 1.3 and the workforce by 2.6 individuals. As
a result, large expansions in public employment have only modest impacts on the local un-
employment rate. Increasing public employment by 50% only reduces the unemployment rate
from 0.156 to 0.149.
In the second empirical approach, we use regression analysis to estimate the effects of public
sector job expansions on decadal changes (1980-1990 and 1990-2001) in the employment and
population of Spanish cities. This analysis exploits the dramatic increase in public employment
that followed the advent of democracy after Franco’s death. Between 1980 and 2001, public
employment grew by 133%, increasing from 1.4 to 3.2 million jobs. We start by analyzing the
determinants of this public sector job expansion across cities. Two important results emerge.
First, more public sector jobs were created in cities experiencing negative labor demand shocks,
providing further evidence that public employment is used by governments to reduce spatial
income inequalities. Second, the provincial capitals (established in 1833) experienced a more
than proportionate increase in public employment between 1980 and 2001. Specifically, being
a capital city implied an additional 1.6 public sector jobs each decade per 100 inhabitants in the
base year. This result is the basis for our Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS) strategy which consists
in using the capital status of cities to instrument for changes in public sector employment. As for
instrument validity, several robustness checks support the assumption made that (conditional
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on initial unemployment, education, location -coast versus inland cities- and size) the capital
status of a city is uncorrelated to shocks in employment and population growth. The TSLS esti-
mates also indicate that one additional public sector job increases private jobs by about 1.3 and
the labor force by 2.7 individuals. The reduced-form estimates obtained imply that increasing
public employment by 50% only reduces the unemployment rate from 0.156 to 0.150.
There are, at least, three factors that serve to rationalize the relatively large multipliers that
we find. First, in the period that we study (1980-2001), interregional migration rates in Spain
were relatively low but, in contrast, intraregional migration rates were substantial (Bover and
Arellano, 2001). Specifically, cities continued to attract migrants from the rural areas within
their region and more public sector jobs in the capital cities might have intensified this process.
Second, the model simulations indicate that land supply elasticity is critical in determining if,
and the extent to which, public employment crowds-in or crowds-out private employment. The
complier cities in our TSLS regressions are relatively small provincial capitals which can be con-
sidered as being cities with a rather elastic land supply. Finally, our model also indicates that
multipliers are greater when public sector wages are high. In Spain, the public sector wage gap
is substantial (Hospido and Moral-Benito, 2014), and this is especially true in small provincial
capitals given that the distribution of public sector wages is more compressed than that of the
private sector.
The paper that is closest to ours is Faggio and Overman (2014), who estimate the local la-
bor market effects of public employment in England. Their main results, based on 2003-2007
employment changes at the English Local Authority level, indicate that public employment nei-
ther increases nor decreases overall private employment, although the industry mix is changed
in favor of the non-tradable sector. When examining a longer time horizon (1999-2007), their
results suggest that, if anything, public employment crowds-out rather than crowds-in private
employment. As Faggio and Overman (2014) recognize, the highly restrictive planning system
prevalent in England (Hilber and Vermeulen, 2015) implies a very inelastic land (and housing)
supply which could explain the absence of significant crowding-in effects on private employ-
ment in that country. We complement the study conducted by Faggio and Overman (2014) in
several ways. First, we estimate the local labor market effects of public employment in Span-
ish cities. For the reasons detailed above, these estimates can be policy-relevant in settings
with unrestrictive planning systems and/or with favorable geography for urban development.
Second, we study a time period in which the Spanish public sector developed, with massive,
geographically heterogeneous increases in public employment. While in the period studied by
Faggio and Overman (2014), public employment in England increased by less than 6%, in our
setting there was an increase of 133%. Third, we develop a search and matching model with
geographical mobility that clarifies the mechanisms through which public employment affects
cities and quantifies their relative importance. Finally, another attractive feature of our study
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is the novel TSLS strategy that we use. Instead of using a Bartik (1991) shift-share instrument
that uses employment in the base year to predict subsequent employment growth, we use a city
feature (the capital status of a city) that dates back to 1833 to predict public employment growth
in the decades of 1980-1990 and 1990-2001. As we document that more public jobs are created
in cities experiencing negative labor demand shocks, building a shift-share instrument with the
1980 and 1990 distribution of public employment could be problematic as these distributions
may reflect past labor demand shocks, which are likely to be correlated over time.
Instead of analyzing the local labor market effects of public employment, Moretti (2010) and
Moretti and Thulin (2013) estimate the local multipliers of jobs in the tradable sector in the
US and Sweden, respectively. Their results indicate that, on average, one additional job in the
tradable sector creates about 1.6 and 0.5 jobs in the non-tradable sector in the typical US and
Swedish city, respectively. Our results, therefore, lie in between these two estimates, but are
closer to the US multipliers.
Beaudry et al. (2012), Kline and Moretti (2013) embed standard search and matching models
à la Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides in spatial equilibrium models (Roback, 1982)2. Beaudry
et al. (2012) set-up a multi-sector, multi-city model with labor market frictions. The empirics
of the paper, which examines changes in wages and employment across cities and industries in
the US, indicate that a positive labor demand shock in one sector increases wages in the rest
of the city’s industries, providing empirical support for labor market frictions and bargaining.
In a similar vein, Kline and Moretti (2013) examine the efficiency of place-based policies in the
presence of geographical mobility and labor market frictions. In relation to these studies, we
go a step further by calibrating the model and using it to simulate the effects of a local labor
market policy. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to do so in the context of search and
matching models with geographical mobility.
Finally, our paper also relates to a recent strand of the macro literature studying the labor
market effects of public employment in national economies. Burdett (2012), Gomes (2015a)
and Bradley et al. (2015) use search and matching models to analyze the effects of public sec-
tor wages and employment on labor market performance3. The conclusions reached regarding
the effects of public employment are much more negative than those obtained in the present
study. Algan et al. (2002) also study the effects of public employment at the national level using
regression analysis applied to a long OECD country-level panel. Their results also suggest strong
crowding-out effects. Specifically, they indicate that one public job crowds-out 1.5 private sec-
tor jobs and increases the number of unemployed by 0.3 individuals. Our study differs from this
strand of the literature in that it estimates the effects at the city (rather than at the national) level.
2A related study is Wrede (2015), which extends the urban economics literature on the measurement of quality
of life by considering the presence of unemployment.
3Quadrini and Trigari (2007) and Gomes (2015b) are concerned instead with the effect of public employment
on the volatility of labor market outcomes.
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Two facts can reconcile our results with those of this literature. First, labor mobility across cities
implies that labor supply is much more elastic at the city than at the national level. In fact, in
our search and matching model, if we consider the case with no geographical mobility, public
employment also crowds-out private employment. Second, at the city level, the public wage bill
is not financed through local taxes as it is typically financed by some upper-tier government.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we develop the theoretical
model. Section 3 presents the calibration of the model (3.1) and the main results of the model
simulations (3.2). Section 4 contains the regression analysis. We describe the data and variables
(4.1) before providing the institutional background and analyzing the city-level determinants of
the public sector job expansion (4.2). Then, we turn to a descriptive (Ordinary Least Squares)
analysis of the effects of public employment on the city’s private employment and population
(4.3) before proceeding to the main TSLS analysis (4.4). The effects of public employment on
the local unemployment rate are addressed in section 4.5 and, finally, section 5 concludes.
2 The model
In this section we develop a search and matching model à la Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides
embedded within a spatial equilibrium model following Beaudry et al. (2012) and Kline and
Moretti (2013). Homogeneous workers can be either employed or unemployed. Employees can
be either in the public sector (g ), in the tradable sector (t ) or in the non-tradable sector (n).
Workers consume all their income on a tradable good, a non-tradable good and land. Unem-
ployed workers can leave the city at no cost.
2.1 Employment and unemployment
Unemployed workers search for jobs in the three sectors simultaneously and enjoy the non-
labor income b. We assume that the public sector is frictionless and job vacancies are instanta-
neously filled. We assume that the public sector wage bill is not financed through local taxation
since the lion’s share of this expenditure is financed by central and regional governments. We
further assume that the public sector job creation rate ( fg ), separation rate (sg ) and wage (wg ),
are all exogenously determined. In the private sector, jobs are filled via a constant returns to
scale matching function, m(uL, vL) = mouχv (1−χ)L, where u is the unemployment rate, v the
vacancy rate and L is the labor force of each city, while χ and mo are the elasticity and scale
matching function parameters, respectively. Unemployed workers find jobs in the tradable and
non-tradable sectors at the endogenous rates fi (θ)= m(uL,vL)uL Ωi , where Ωi represents the frac-
tion of vacant jobs in each sector with i = t ,n, i.e. Ωi = vivt+vn . In turn, vacancies in the pri-
vate sector are filled at rate q(θ), where θ represents the tightness of the private labor market
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in the city (vacancies-unemployment ratio), θ ≡ vt+vnu ≡ vu 4. According to the properties of the
matching function, the higher the number of vacancies with respect to the number of unem-
ployed workers, the easier it is to find a job, f ′(θ)> 0, and the more difficult it is to fill a vacancy,
q ′(θ)< 0.
The jobs in the tradable and non-tradable sectors can be either filled or vacant. Before a po-
sition is filled, the firm has to open a job vacancy with a flow cost ki . Private firms have a technol-
ogy with labor as the only input. Each filled job in the tradable sector yields instantaneous profit
equal to the difference between the marginal productivity of labor and the wage. The price of
the tradable good is exogenous and normalized to one as tradable goods are sold in national (or
international) markets, implying that the instantaneous profit amounts to At (L)−wt . We con-
sider that productivity increases with city size due to agglomeration economies5. Specifically,
the marginal productivity of labor is given by At (L) = At0 Lζ, where 0 < ζ < 1 and At0 captures
the exogenous technological level in the tradable sector. In turn, the instantaneous profit of
the non-tradable sector is equal to pn −wn , which increases with the (endogenous) price of the
non-tradable good, pn 6. Employed workers in the tradable and non-tradable sectors separate
from their firm at the (sector-specific) constant rate si .
Thus, the value of vacancies Vt and Vn , and the value of a job in the tradable and non-
tradable sectors, Jt and Jn , are represented by the following Bellman equations:
r Vt = −kt +q(θ)(Jt −Vt ), (1)
r Vn = −kn +q(θ)(Jn −Vn), (2)
r Jt = At (L)−wt + st (Vt − Jt ), (3)
r Jn = pn −wn + sn(Vn − Jn). (4)
Firms in the tradable and non-tradable sectors will open vacancies until the expected value of
vacancies becomes zero. Thus, the free entry condition in these two sectors are:
r Vt = 0, (5)
4By the homogeneity of the matching function this ratio is not a function of L.
5See Combes and Gobillon (2015) for a recent review of the empirics of agglomeration economies.
6We do not consider agglomeration effects in the non-tradable sector as there is less room for productivity
increases in that sector (Moretti (2012), p.57).
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r Vn = 0. (6)
2.2 Workers
Each worker consumes a tradable and a non-tradable good, and land. Hence, a worker’s utility
in a city depends on their nominal income, y = {b, wg , wt , wn} as well as on the city’s prices
of the non-tradable good (pn) and land (pc )7. We assume that workers have a Cobb-Douglas
utility function which delivers indirect utility V (y, pn , pc ) = y
(
1−φ−δ)(1−φ−δ) ( φpn )φ ( δpc )δ = yP ,
defining P as the city’s price index8.
P =
(
1
1−φ−δ
)(1−φ−δ) (pn
φ
)φ (pc
δ
)δ
. (7)
The parameters φ and δ reflect workers’ preferences for the non-tradable good and land,
respectively, as well as being the income shares spent on these two goods. The values for unem-
ployment (U ) and employment in the public (Wg ), tradable (Wt ) and non-tradable (Wn) sectors
are given by the following expressions:
rU = b
P
+ fg (Wg −U )+ ft (Wt −U )+ fn(Wn −U ), (8)
r Wg =
wg
P
+ sg (U −Wg ), (9)
r Wt = wt
P
+ st (U −Wt ), (10)
r Wn = wn
P
+ sn(U −Wn). (11)
We assume that unemployed individuals can move to another city at zero cost, implying that
the utility of unemployed workers is equalized across cities. Since we assume that each city is
7Note that we do not consider non-participation in the labor market. As the regression results in section 4 show,
the results do not indicate that public employment in a city increases labor force participation.
8In our model, having more public employees in the city does not increase the provision of local public goods
and services and, thus, it does not increase city amenities. We take this modeling approach because, as will be-
come clear below, public employees in capital cities provide public goods and services (administrative services,
universities and hospitals) that clearly do not only benefit the city’s residents.
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small relative to the whole economy, the value of unemployment is fixed at z. Alternatively, if
we consider intraregional migrations between the city and its hinterland, z would be the utility
level achieved in the city’s hinterland.
rU = z, (12)
Taking equations 8 and 12 implies that, in equilibrium, if the labor market prospects of a city
improve (high wages, high job finding rates and/or low job separation rates), then the city must
become a more expensive place to live-in (higher price index).
The next assumption is that wages in the tradable and non-tradable sectors are set through
Nash bargaining. The Nash solution is the wage that maximizes the weighted product of the
worker’s and firm’s net return from the job match. The first-order condition from this maxi-
mization problem is9:
1
P
βJt = (1−β)(Wt −U ), (13)
1
P
βJn = (1−β)(Wn −U ), (14)
where the parameter β represents the worker’s bargaining power.
To fully characterize the dynamics of this economy, we need to define the law of motion for
the unemployment rate (u), and for the employment rates in the public (eg ), tradable (et ) and
non-tradable (en) sectors. These evolve according to the following differential equations:
u˙ = sg eg + st et + sn en − fg u− ft u− fn u, (15)
e˙g = fg u− sg eg , (16)
e˙t = ft u− st et , (17)
e˙n = fnu− sn en , (18)
9The derivation of equations 13 and 14 are presented in Appendix A.
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eg +et +en +u = 1. (19)
Notice that the levels of unemployment and employment in the public, tradable and non-
tradable sectors are uL, eg L, et L and enL, respectively.
In order to close the model, the markets for the non-tradable good and land must clear. The
non-tradable good must be purchased by local workers.
φ(wg eg +wt et +wnen +b u)= pnen . (20)
Finally, we assume that land rents accrue to absentee land owners and, following Combes
et al. (2012), we assume that land price is increasing with city size according to:
pc = Lη. (21)
2.3 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, the system of equations can be reduced to the following twelve key equations
that characterize the behavior of the endogenous variables θ, ft , fn , pn , pc , wt , wn , et , en , L, At
and u:
kt
q(θ)
= At (L)−wt
(r + st )
, (22)
kn
q(θ)
= pn −wn
(r + sn)
, (23)
wt = βAt (L)+
(
(1−β)b+βθ(Ωt kt +Ωnkn)
) (r + sg )
(r + sg + fg )
+ fg (1−β)wg
(r + sg + fg )
, (24)
wn = βpn +
(
(1−β)b+βθ(Ωt kt +Ωnkn)
) (r + sg )
(r + sg + fg )
+ fg (1−β)wg
(r + sg + fg )
, (25)
u = sg st sn
[st sn sg + sg st fn + sg ft sn + fg st sn]
, (26)
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eg =
fg
sg
u, (27)
et = ft
st
u, (28)
eg +et +en +u = 1, (29)
1
P
[
b+ fg
(r + sg + fg )
(wg −b)+
(r + sg )βθ(Ωt kt +Ωnkn)
(r + sg + fg )(1−β)
]
= z, (30)
φ(wg eg +wt et +wnen +b u)= pnen , (31)
pc = Lη, (32)
At (L)= At0 Lζ. (33)
Equations 22 and 23 are the standard job creation curves that characterize the marginal con-
dition for the demand of labor in the tradable and non-tradable sectors, respectively. More jobs
are created if wages, vacancy costs and labor market tightness are low and if marginal revenue
(At (L) or pn) is high. Equations 24 and 25 are the respective wage curves that replace the labor
supply curves of Walrasian models (Pissarides (2000), page 17)10. As in Beaudry et al. (2012),
frictions and bargaining result in wages in the private sector that depend on the wage and on
the job finding and job separation rates in the public sector11. In turn, equations 26 to 29 char-
acterize the unemployment rate and the employment rates in the public, tradable and non-
tradable sectors in steady state. Equations 30, 32 and 33 appear as a consequence of workers’
mobility. Equation 30 relates the unemployment value (z) to the city’s land price and job mar-
ket prospects, while 32 and 33 specify the rate at which the land price and productivity in the
tradable sector increase with city size. Finally, equation 31 guarantees that the local price of the
non-tradable good clears the market.
10The derivation of equations 24 and 25 are provided in Appendix B.
11If there is no public employment ( fg = sg = 0), the wage equations reduce to their standard form (Pissarides
(2000), p.18). Specifically, wt =βAt (L)+ (1−β)b+βθ(Ωt kt +Ωnkn) and wn =βpn + (1−β)b+βθ(Ωt kt +Ωnkn).
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3 Calibration and simulated results of the model
3.1 Calibration
We calibrate the model to match the labor market characteristics of the average Spanish city
with transition rates defined at quarterly frequencies. Table 1 summarizes all the calibrated
parameters and presents the steady state values of the endogenous variables. The real interest
rate is fixed at r = 0.012, which is consistent with an annual interest rate of 4.8%. We target
the 2001 city averages in terms of the unemployment rate (15.6%) and the employment rates
in the public sector (20.9%), the tradable sector (15.8%) and the non-tradable sector (47.7%).
Using the Spanish Labor Force Survey (SLFS) and adopting the methodology applied in Silva
and Vázquez-Grenno (2013), we calculate the separation rates in the three sectors considered.
While the separation rate in the public sector is sg = 0.009, in the tradable and non-tradable
sectors these rates are higher and virtually identical with st = sn = 0.015. Combining the job
separation rates, the employment rates and the unemployment rate with e˙g = e˙t = e˙n = u˙ = 0
delivers the job finding rates fg = 0.012, ft = 0.015 and fn = 0.046.
Since we do not observe vacant jobs, to calibrate the model, we assume that the fraction of
job vacancies in each of the two private sectors (Ωi ) is given by the observed employment shares.
Thus, we set Ωt = 0.249 and Ωn = 0.751. This implies that the aggregate job finding rate in the
private sector is f = ft + fn = 0.061. We normalize the labor market tightness to one, θ = 1. Once
Ωn , u and θ are known, we obtain the vacancy rates for the tradable and non-tradable sectors
using Ωn = vnvt+vn and θ =
vt+vn
u . We obtain vt = 0.039 and vn = 0.117 and, thus, v = vt + vn =
0.156. Finally, the vacancy filling rate is q(θ) = f (θ)θ = 0.061. Pissarides and Petrongolo (2001)
identify the matching function elasticity parameter as being in the 0.5-0.7 range. We take 0.6 as
our reference and, thus, we set χ= 0.6. Given that we know the job finding rates and θ, we can
then use f =moθ1−χ to obtain the matching function scale parameter mo = 0.061.
As for wages, we normalize the wage in the public sector to one (wg = 1). Following Hospido
and Moral-Benito (2014), we target a wage gap of 20% between the public and private sectors.
Similarly, we estimate the wage gap between the tradable and the non-tradable sectors using
the Spanish Continuous Sample of Working Lives in 2005 (Muestra continua de Vidas Laborales,
MCVL). We find a gap of 11.9% after controlling for individual characteristics (age, age square,
gender and education), leaving us with wt = 0.913 and wn = 0.807.
According to Eurostat, labor productivity in the Spanish tradable sector was 45.7% higher
than personnel costs12. Thus, we set labor productivity at At (L) = wt ∗ 1.457 = 1.331. As for
agglomeration economies, Ciccone and Hall (1996) and Rosenthal and Strange (2008) find an
elasticity of (total factor) productivity with respect to density of around 4-5%13. One concern
122008-2010 average from Eurostat - Structural Business Statistics.
13The studies quantifying the effect of (log) density on (log) productivity (or wages) typically include, as a re-
gressor, the city’s land surface. Hence, the elasticity of density is also the elasticity of city size.
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with these studies is that highly-skilled workers are positively selected into the largest cities, thus
over-estimating the effect of city size on productivity (Combes and Gobillon, 2015). Therefore,
we set this elasticity at 3%, i.e. ζ= 0.03. We normalize the labor force to one (L = 1) which implies
Aot = 1.331 given equation 33 and pc = 1 given equation 32. We assume that η, the elasticity of
the land price with respect to city size, is 0.72 as has been recently estimated by Combes et al.
(2012).
The last two parameters determined by data are the income shares spent on the non-tradable
good and land. For the former share, we use data from the Household Budget Survey (HBS) for
2006. We set the share of income that workers spend on the non-tradable good (φ) at 0.614. In
order to determine the income share spent on land, we multiply the income share dedicated
to housing by the share of land in housing values. We set the first quantity at 0.293, which is
slightly higher than the values reported for the US by Davis and Ortalo-Magne (2011) and for
France by Combes et al. (2012)15. The second quantity, the share of land in housing values, is
directly available from the BBVA capital stock series. This quantity closely follows the Spanish
housing periods of boom and bust. We take 0.233, the average value for the pre-boom period
(1995-1998), which is very similar to the estimates reported by Albouy (2009) and Combes et al.
(2012) for the US and French economies, respectively. The product of these two quantities is
very close to 7% and, thus, we set δ = 0.07. The income share spent on tradable goods is thus
obtained as 1−φ−δ which amounts to 0.33.
Knowing wt , At (L), q(θ), r and st , we can use 22 to find the vacancy cost in the tradable
sector kt . There are no other variables or parameters that can be identified by a single equation.
The price of the non-tradable good, pn , along with the parameters b (non-labor income), β
(the workers’ bargaining power), z (the value of unemployment) and kn (the vacancy cost in the
non-tradable sector) are jointly determined by equations 23, 24, 25, 30 and 31.
3.2 Simulated results
Table 2 presents the simulated results of the model with a job creation policy scenario that tar-
gets increases of 25, 50 and 100% in the level of public employment, Leg . The size of these public
employment increases is consistent with the public sector employment expansions observed in
Spanish cities in the period 1980-2001. These scenarios correspond to increases in the public
job finding rate, fg , from 0.012 to 0.014, 0.015 and 0.017, respectively.
Increasing public employment in a city implies a higher demand for the non-tradable good.
14It is not always obvious whether to classify household expenditure as tradable or non-tradable spending at the
city level. In general, we consider services to be non-tradable goods.
15Imputed rents from the Living Conditions Survey (LCS) look abnormally low in Spain. We take rental values
from a leading listing website (Fotocasa). In 2012, the average rent was 7.220 euros a month per square meter. The
average dwelling in Spain is 90.6m2 (2011 Population and Housing Census) which gives us an annual rent of 7,850
euros. If we take the average household income in Spain (26,775 euros according to LCS), we obtain a share of
income spent on housing of 0.293.
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Table 1: Calibrated parameter values
Parameters Value Source/Target
Interest rate, r 0.012 Data
Separation rate public sector, sg 0.009 SLFS
Separation rate tradable sector, st 0.015 SLFS
Separation rate non-tradable sector, sn 0.015 SLFS
Matching function elasticity parameter, χ 0.600 (Pissarides and Petrongolo, 2001)
Matching function scale parameter, mo 0.061 Matching function
Wage public sector, wg 1.000 Normalization
Exogenous productivity tradable sector, Ato 1.331 Eurostat & L = 1
Agglomeration economies’ elasticity, ζ 0.030 (Combes and Gobillon, 2015)
Land cost to city size elasticity, η 0.720 (Combes et al., 2012)
Non-tradable good income share, φ 0.600 HBS
Land income share, δ 0.070 LCS, BBVA & Fotocasa
Workers’ bargaining power, β 0.313 Solves 23, 24, 25, 30 and 31
Non-labor income, b 0.315 Solves 23, 24, 25, 30 and 31
Unemployment utility, z 0.308 Solves 23, 24, 25, 30 and 31
Vacancy cost tradable sector, kt 0.944 Solves 22
Vacancy cost non-tradable sector, kn 0.415 Solves 23, 24, 25, 30 and 31
Variables
Public employment rate, eg 0.209 2001 Census
Tradable employment rate, et 0.158 2001 Census
Non-tradable employment rate, en 0.477 2001 Census
Unemployment rate, u 0.156 2001 Census
Labor market tightness, θ 1.000 Normalization
Wage tradable sector, wt 0.913 MCVL
Wage non-tradable sector, wn 0.807 MCVL
Labor force, L 1.000 Normalization
Job finding rate public sector, fg 0.012 Solves 27
Job finding rate tradable sector, ft 0.015 Solves 28
Job finding rate non-tradable sector, fn 0.046 Solves 29
Land price, pc 1.000 Solves 32
Productivity tradable sector, At 1.331 Eurostat & L = 1 & Solves 33
Non-tradable good price, pn 0.990 Solves 23, 24, 25, 30 and 31
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However, expanding public employment with well paid jobs increases local private wages and,
thus, employment in the non-tradable sector may either increase or decrease. The simulations
indicate that the demand effect clearly dominates the wage effect. Specifically, one public sector
job creates between 1.2 and 1.3 jobs in the non-tradable sector. In contrast, an increase in public
employees does not raise the demand for locally produced tradable goods. As a result, the effect
on tradable employment is smaller and is determined by two opposing forces: higher wages,
on the one hand, decrease employment, while agglomeration economies, on the other, increase
employment. In this sector, the simulations imply multipliers that are either positive but very
small (0.013) or negative (-0.054 to -0.012).
Table 2 also indicates that an increase in the number of public jobs in the city increases
the size of its labor force. These effects are substantial. An additional public job increases the
city’s labor force by 2.4 to 2.7 workers. A larger city increases the price of land as well as the
price of the non-tradable good. This higher cost-of-living (the price index P ) offsets better labor
market prospects. The population inflow weakens the link between more jobs and a lower un-
employment rate in the city. For instance, increasing public employment by 50% only reduces
the unemployment rate from 0.156 to 0.149. Similarly, if we focus on employment rates instead
of employment levels, the local labor market effects of public employment are not so positive. If
we take the scenario of a 50% increase in public employment, the share of workers employed in
the private sector actually falls. While the employment rate in the non-tradable sector increases
very little (by 0.004), the employment rate in the tradable sector falls by 0.034, which is very simi-
lar the increase in the employment rate in the public sector (i.e. 0.038). The same picture occurs
if we examine the job finding rates. In the tradable sector, the rate falls from 0.015 to 0.012,
while in the non-tradable sector it increases from 0.046 to 0.048. The same pattern is found with
the vacancy rate (the sum of the vacancy rates in the tradable and non-tradable sectors) which
falls more than the unemployment rate and, as a consequence, labor market tightness actually
decreases.
Table 2: Benchmark simulated results with an increase in public employment
f g θ ft fn pn pc wt wn Leg Let Len L u
Baseline
0.012 1.000 0.015 0.046 0.990 1.000 0.913 0.807 0.209 0.158 0.477 1.000 0.156
25% increase in public employment
0.014 0.993 0.014 0.047 0.997 1.101 0.920 0.814 0.263 0.159 0.547 1.142 0.152
Multipliers 0.013 1.304 2.650
50% increase in public employment
0.015 0.988 0.012 0.048 1.002 1.186 0.926 0.820 0.313 0.157 0.609 1.267 0.149
Multipliers -0.012 1.268 2.573
100% increase in public employment
0.017 0.978 0.010 0.050 1.011 1.34 0.935 0.830 0.418 0.147 0.729 1.510 0.144
Multipliers -0.054 1.207 2.445
Note: Multipliers are calculated as the employment or labor force change divided by the employment increase in
the public sector.
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3.3 Alternative simulations of the model
In this section we present model simulations for two alternative scenarios. First, we consider
the model without geographic mobility. Second, we study the relationship between the size of
the multipliers and the magnitude of the public sector wage gap.
3.3.1 The model without labor mobility
We consider the model with a fixed city size (L = 1), which implies that the productivity in the
tradable sector and the price of land are fixed. Since there is no mobility, it is no longer true that
rU = z. In terms of the equations that characterize the equilibrium, we drop equations 30, 32
and 3316. Table 3 shows the simulated results with an increase in the public job creation rate
from 0.012 to 0.020 (a 50 % increase in the level of public employment).
Table 3: Simulated results without labor mobility across cities
f g θ ft fn pn pc wt wn Leg Let Len L u
Baseline
0.012 1.000 0.015 0.046 0.990 1.000 0.913 0.807 0.209 0.158 0.477 1.000 0.156
50% increase in public employment
0.020 0.925 0.006 0.053 1.008 1.000 0.934 0.832 0.314 0.059 0.488 1.000 0.139
Multipliers -0.944 0.105 0.000
Note: Multipliers are calculated as the employment change divided by the employment increase in the public
sector.
In stark contrast with the case considered above in which geographic mobility was consid-
ered, public employment clearly crowds-out private employment. While one extra job in the
public sector destroys about 0.9 jobs in the tradable sector, it only creates 0.1 jobs in the non-
tradable sector. As discussed above, the tradable sector is more negatively affected than the non-
tradable sector as an increase in the number of public employees does not increase the demand
for locally produced tradable goods. Since one public sector job destroys less than one job in the
private sector, unemployment is reduced, falling from 0.156 to 0.139. In this scenario, the link
between more public sector jobs and less unemployment is not weakened by the inflow of work-
ers but rather by the destruction of private sector jobs. Considering a closed economy brings the
results of the simulations much more closely in line with those of the macroeconomics literature
analyzing the impact of public employment on (national) labor markets (Burdett (2012), Gomes
(2015a), Bradley et al. (2015) and Algan et al. (2002)).
These simulations show that whether public employment crowds-in or crowds-out private
employment depends crucially on the extent to which city size increases following a public em-
ployment expansion. In fact, even if workers are mobile, public employment can not trigger an
inflow of workers if land supply is very inelastic, which results in public employment crowding-
out private jobs. Indeed, the simulations (not reported here for reasons of space) indicate that
16As shown in Appendix B, the wage equations are obtained without using the condition rU = z.
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the elasticity of land price with respect to city size (η), together with the income share spent on
land (δ), are the key parameters governing whether (and the extent to which) public employ-
ment crowds-in or crowds-out private employment.
3.3.2 Size of multipliers and the public wage premium
We simulate two alternative scenarios that differ in the size of the wage gap between the public
and the private sectors. In each scenario, we recalibrate the model maintaining the rest of the
targets and simulating the effect of an increase in public employment of 50%. First, we reduce
the public sector wage gap to 10% while, later, we increase it to 30%. The baseline scenario
(Table 2, row 2) is reproduced here in the second row for ease of comparison, and it corresponds
to a public sector wage gap of 20%. Table 4 shows the simulated results.
Table 4: Simulation results: Size of multipliers and the public wage premium
f g θ ft fn pn pc wt wn Leg Let Len L u
50% increase in public employment & 10% public wage gap
0,016 0,990 0,049 0,012 1,082 1,140 1,007 0,892 0,312 0,137 0,575 1,200 0,146
Multipliers -0.203 0.950 1.938
50% increase in public employment & 20% public wage gap (Table 2, second row)
0.015 0.988 0.012 0.048 1.002 1.186 0.926 0.820 0.313 0.157 0.609 1.267 0.149
Multipliers -0.012 1.268 2.573
50% increase in public employment & 30% public wage gap
0,014 0,987 0,048 0,013 0,934 1,218 0,856 0,759 0,315 0,170 0,633 1,315 0,151
Multipliers 0.111 1.470 2.979
Note: Multipliers are calculated as the employment or labor force change divided by the employment increase in
the public sector.
The simulations indicate that higher public sector wages increase the positive multiplier ef-
fects of public employment. Increasing the public wage gap from 10 to 30% increases the esti-
mated employment multipliers from -0.2 to 0.1 in the tradable sector, and from 0.9 to 1.5 in the
non-tradable sector. Similarly, the labor force multiplier increases from 1.9 to 3. This result is
consistent with the findings reported in Moretti (2010) and Moretti and Thulin (2013). Specifi-
cally, they find multipliers from the tradable to the non-tradable sectors that are especially high
when the jobs in the tradable sector command high wages. Here, too, the effects of public em-
ployment on private employment are quite sensitive to the public sector wage gap.
4 Reduced-form estimates: Evidence from the late development
of the Spanish public sector: 1980-2001
In this section, using regression analysis, we estimate the city-level effects of public sector job
expansions. To that end, we exploit the uneven geography of the substantial increase in pub-
lic sector employment that took place in Spain in the period 1980-2001 following the advent
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of democracy. Since we are interested in the long-run effects of public employment (changes
between steady states in terms of the model developed above), we examine decadal changes
(1980-1990 and 1990-2001) in the employment and population of Spanish cities. This exercise
enables us to assess the degree to which the simulated results of the model match carefully esti-
mated reduced-form coefficients. This section is organized as follows. After describing the data
and variables used in the analysis, we provide a description of the geography of the expansion
of public sector jobs. Then, we report Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates before turning to
the main instrumental variable analysis that uses a city’s capital status as an instrument for local
public sector employment growth.
4.1 Data and variables
We draw primarily on Census data on employment and population. In the case of employment,
the data are drawn from Censuses of Establishments carried out in 1980, 1990 and 2001, which
contain counts of employees by municipality and by the main economic activity (2-digit level)
of the establishment in which the employee works. In the case of population, we use population
counts by labor market status from the 1981, 1990 and 2001 Population Censuses. We also have
access to some data on employment and population from the 1970 Censuses. We then construct
city-wide counts of these variables using the 2008 urban area definitions built by the Ministry of
Housing17. We work with a total of 83 cities (urban areas) whose locations and extensions are
shown in Figure 1. In 2001, these cities concentrated 67% of the population18. The median city
(Ourense) had 126,410 inhabitants in 2001. The size of the two largest cities - Madrid (5,135,225)
and Barcelona (4,391,196)- exceeds that of Soria (35,151) and Teruel (33,158) -the smallest two-
by a factor of one hundred.
Our public sector definition includes three industries: public administration (which includes
the police and military forces), education and health. There are workers in the education and
health sectors that are not public employees. Unfortunately, our data does not allow us to distin-
guish between private and public employees in these two activities. With this caveat in mind, we
include the education and health sectors in our definition of the public sector for two reasons:
First, because the majority of these workers are directly employed by governments (in 1999, 67
and 61% of the workers in education and health, respectively19); and, second, because there are
many public services in education and health that, being partly financed by the public sector,
are provided by private firms. The main instance of this is that of primary and secondary edu-
cation where the teachers’ salaries in the majority of privately run schools (so-called Educación
concertada) are paid by regional governments. Similar arrangements also exist in the health
17The same definitions are used in De la Roca and Puga (2013).
18We do not consider Ceuta and Melilla, the two Spanish enclaves in North Africa.
19These figures have been computed with the first term Labor Force Survey of 1999.
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Figure 1: Urban areas (cities) in Spain
Source: Cities (urban areas) in 2008 -Ministerio de la vivienda. Capital cities (52) in red and non-capital
cities (31) in blue. The map excludes Menorca (far east) and La Palma, La Gomera and El Hierro (far west)
as no urban area is found in these islands.
sector.
Total employment is the sum of employees in the public sector (Eg ), the tradable sector (Et )
and the non-tradable sector (En)20. We assimilate the tradable sector with the manufacturing in-
dustries, while non-tradable employment contains the workers in private activities that produce
goods that can not be traded and includes the construction sector21. Our model also predicts
that public sector expansions increase city size. Thus, we also consider (changes in) the city-
level (economically) active population, working age population and total population. Since in
the model developed above all individuals are active in the labor market, the city size measure
used there L corresponds more closely to active population.
In the regression analysis, we examine decadal (1980-1990 and 1990-2001) increases in the
employment and population measures detailed above relative to the city population in the base
20We do not consider agriculture, farming and mining activities as they have been treated differently in different
Censuses.
21Business services are clearly tradable goods. However, the 2-digit industry classification that is available to us
does not often allow us to separate business vs. personal services within an industry code.
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year (1980 or 1990). The first two panels of Table 5 provide summary statistics for employment
and population levels in 1980 and 2001 at the city level. The third panel reports summary statis-
tics for the outcome variables that we examine below, namely, pooled employment and popula-
tion decadal changes (1980-1990 and 1990-2001) relative to the population level at the beginning
of the decade.
Table 5: Employment and population in Spanish cities (1980-2001): Summary statistics
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max
Employment and population levels in 1980 (N=83)
Tradable employment 21,127 5,577 61,225 113 474,588
Non-tradable employment 30,026 10,625 75,550 1,551 513,539
Total employment 64,353 18,914 163,557 2,032 1,067,467
Active population 82,000 23,789 208,017 2,526 1,367,068
Working age population 180,138 52,284 428,575 10,672 2,812,315
Total population 296,136 96,763 689,109 18,022 4,546,343
Public employment 13,200 5,495 30,638 368 243,589
Employment and population levels in 2001 (N=83)
Tradable employment 22,523 6,218 62,847 993 487,367
Non-tradable employment 67,688 23,003 172,171 5,397 1,252,375
Total employment 119,700 43,641 294,959 10,447 2,033,004
Active population 141,829 52,138 340,127 13,247 2,357,121
Working age population 228,056 87,123 520,014 19,828 3,609,102
Total population 330,320 126,410 747,146 31,158 5,135,225
Public employment 29,489 12,459 64,742 1,872 488,260
Employment and population decadal changes relative to the city’s
population in the base year (1980-1990 & 1990-2001 pooled changes, N=166)
Tradable employment 0.005 0.005 0.019 -0.052 0.115
Non-tradable employment 0.061 0.052 0.041 -0.067 0.264
Total employment 0.095 0.089 0.058 -0.137 0.308
Active population 0.109 0.103 0.060 -0.119 0.356
Working age population 0.109 0.090 0.091 -0.029 0.584
Population 0.105 0.078 0.160 -0.088 0.959
Public employment 0.029 0.028 0.019 -0.031 0.093
Control variables: Pooled observations for 1980 and 1990 (N=166)
Unemployment rate 0.181 0.170 0.061 0.042 0.406
Share of college graduates 0.080 0.079 0.032 0.024 0.170
Coast 0.446 0.000 0.499 0 1
Coast north 0.084 0.000 0.279 0 1
Share of vacation-homes in 1991 18.684 11.603 16.252 3.830 77.826
Total population in 1970 240,644 75,857 566,044 12,776 3,630,338
Note: Variables as defined in the main text.
Starting with total population, the city average increased by 11.5% between 1980 and 2001.
Since the sample is fixed over time (N=83), 11.5 is also the growth rate of the entire urban popu-
lation in Spain. This figure exceeds 8.6%, the population growth experienced by Spain as a whole
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during this period, and indicates that the share of the population living in urban areas increased
between 1980 and 2001. This higher growth experienced by cities is explained mostly by in-
traregional migrations from rural areas to cities (Bover and Arellano (2001) and Jofre-Monseny
(2014)). Note that the average population growth rate over one decade (third panel) is 10.5%,
which reveals that in Spain, small cities have grown more than large cities. In fact, mean rever-
sion in population growth is a prevalent feature of our city-level data and one that needs to be
taken into account in the regression analysis. The economically active population has grown far
more (73%) in Spanish cities during this period as women entered the labor force en masse22.
Similarly, (urban) employment increased by 86% between 1980 and 2001. This increase was not
uniform across economic sectors as the economy experienced a process of tertiarization with
employment in the tradable sector growing by only 6.6% between 1980 and 2001.
4.2 The geography of public sector employment expansion
In Spain, the public sector developed at a surprisingly late date. Development started with the
advent of democracy following Franco’s death in 1975 and the introduction of the new constitu-
tion in 1978. While in 1980, the tax revenue to GDP ratio was only 22.6%, by 2001 this ratio had
reached 33.9%23. This growth in the relative size of the public sector, combined with vigorous
economic growth (the average annual real GDP growth rate between 1980 and 2001 was 2.95%)
resulted in very large increases in public sector jobs. Table 6 shows the number of jobs in public
administration, education and health in 1980, 1990 and 2001.
Table 6: Public sector jobs in Spain (1980-2001)
Year Public sector Public administration Education Health
1980 1,372,463 526,479 463,377 382,607
1990 2,114,351 816,514 665,896 631,941
2001 3,199,055 1,260,872 967,717 970,466
Source: Nationwide employment counts.
Between 1980 and 2001, there were job increases of 139, 109 and 154% in public adminis-
tration, education and health, respectively. Taking the three sectors together, the increase in
the number of public sector jobs during this period amounts to 133%, growing from 1.4 million
in 1980 to almost 3.2 million jobs in 2001. For the three sectors making up the public sector
as defined herein, public administration increased from 0.526 to 1.261 million jobs, the educa-
tion sector rose from 0.463 to 0.967 million while employment in the health sector went from
0.382 to 0.970 million. In the urban areas studied here, the increase in public sector jobs was
22According to the 1981 and 2001 Censuses, between these two years the participation rate of females aged 25-64
increased from 21 to 58%
23OECD Statistics
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slightly lower than that recorded in Spain as a whole (123 versus 133%). This, coupled with the
higher population growth of the urban areas, implies that public sector employment has grown
disproportionately more in the non-urban areas of Spain.
Across cities, public sector jobs are also unevenly distributed. The size of the public sector is
determined by and large by its administrative status. In Spain, there are provincial and regional
capitals. Provinces (and the associated capitals) were established in 1833 by Javier de Burgos
and constituted the main territorial division of the country until the advent of democracy. Al-
though the provinces were not suppressed, 17 regions (Comunidades Autónomas) were built as
aggregations of one or more provinces in 1981. Twenty years later, Spain was a decentralized
country in which the spending of the Comunidades Autónomas amounted to roughly 46% of to-
tal government spending24. A similar picture is obtained if we look at the distribution of public
employees across tiers of government. In 2001, regional governments employed 45% of public
employees whereas the central government and local governments employed the remaining 34
and 21%25.
Figure 2 plots the presence of public employees in cities, distinguishing between regional
and provincial capitals, and non-capital cities. With two exceptions (Santiago de Compostela
and Mérida), the cities hosting regional governments are also provincial capitals26. Non-capital
cities, such as El Ejido, Elda-Petrer and Torrevieja, have the lowest presence of public employees
in 2001 with less than 5 employees per 100 inhabitants. At the other end of the scale, provincial
capitals, such as Soria, Teruel, Ciudad-Real and Toledo, have more than 15 public employees per
100 inhabitants. More generally, this figure corroborates that being a capital is associated with
public employees, and the difference is especially large for small cities. Holding population size
constant, the presence of public employment is similar in provincial and regional capitals. This
suggests that the process of regional decentralization that took place in Spain between 1981
and 2001 was not accompanied by a significant shift in public employment from provincial to
regional capitals. On the contrary, pre-democratic provincial capitals kept their status quo in
terms of public employment. On the one hand, provincial institutions (Diputaciones being the
most prominent example) persisted into democratic Spain. On the other hand, provincial cap-
itals managed to attract regional government public jobs. In the light of this, we only consider
two types of city: capitals (regardless of their being provincial or regional) and non-capitals.
There are 52 capital cities (50 provincial capitals in addition to Santiago de Compostela and
Mérida) and 31 non-capital cities. Figure 1 shows the capital cities (in red) and non-capital
cities (in blue) within Spain.
24Excluding social security spending. See Carrión-i Silvestre et al. (2008) for a detailed explanation of the decen-
tralization process.
25Registro Central de Personal, Ministerio de Hacienda y de Administraciones Públicas.
26These two cities are historically important. Mérida was the capital of the Roman Lusitania province and San-
tiago is the destination of a major Catholic pilgrimage route. Moreover, these are the third cities in two bicephalic
regions: Galicia (La Coruña and Vigo) and Extremadura (Cáceres and Badajoz).
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Figure 2: Public sector employees in 2001 per 100 inhabitants
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Figure 3 plots the (per capita) increase in public sector employment between 1980 and 2001
in the capital and non-capital cities. It shows that when public sector employment grew after the
advent of democracy, growth was more pronounced in the capital cities, the differences being
especially notable in small cities. The first row in Table 7 quantifies the (raw) over-representation
of public employment in the capital cities. While the non-capital cities had 6.3 public sector
workers per 100 inhabitants in 2001, the corresponding figure for the capital cities was 11.1. Al-
though the difference is smaller in magnitude, per capita public sector workers also increased
more in the capital cities between 1981 and 2001. The increase was 3.6 in non-capital cities
vs. 5.1 in capital cities. Rows 1 to 4 in Table 7 show that the over-representation of public em-
ployment in capital cities, both in 2001 levels as well as in the changes between 1980 and 2001,
occurred in public administration but also in the education and health sectors, as institutions
like universities and hospitals also tend to concentrate in capital cities.
We now turn to a more systematic analysis of the city-level determinants of the public sector
employment expansion in the period 1980-2001. Specifically, we run regressions of the following
type:
Eg ,t+10−Eg ,t
Popt
=αt +β ·C api t al +δ z+²t (34)
where the left-hand side variable is the decadal increase in public sector jobs (1980-1990 or
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Figure 3: Public sector job increase between 1980 and 2001 per 100 inhabitants
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Table 7: Public sector jobs in capital versus non-capital cities (per 100 inhabitants)
2001 1980-2001
Capital Non-capital Capital Non-capital
Public sector 11.120 6.320 5.140 3.550
Public administration 4.530 2.390 2.060 1.460
Education 3.170 1.950 1.510 0.850
Health 3.420 1.970 1.560 1.240
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1990-2001) relative to the population level in the base year (1980 or 1990)27. In turn, αt is a set
of time dummies while C api t al is an indicator variable for capital cities. Finally, z contains
some control variables that we consider in some of the specifications. The results are reported
in Table 8.
The first column shows the results with no other control variables than time dummies. These
estimates indicate that, in the period 1980-2001, being a capital implied an additional 0.7 public
workers each decade for every 100 inhabitants in the city in the base year. In the second column,
we also consider population growth as a control variable despite its endogenous nature (public
sector jobs might increase population as the model developed above predicts). When doing so,
the capital effect increases, implying that being a capital is associated with 1.1 extra public jobs
for every 100 inhabitants each decade. To assess the relative magnitude of this effect, note that
the population growth coefficient (0.036) indicates that an increase of 100 residents is associated
with an increase of 3.6 public sector workers. As explained above, there is ample evidence from
different countries indicating public employment is used to offset local labor demand shocks.
To test if this has also been the case in our application, in the last specification (column 3), we
include a Bartik (1991) shift-share variable that captures demand driven private employment
changes in city:
Ep,t+10−Ep,t
Popt
=
∑
h
(
Eh,t
E N˜h,t
E N˜h,t+10−Eh,t
)
Popt
, (35)
where Ep stands for private employment (the sum of tradable and non-tradable workers), h
indexes the (2-digit) industries within the private sector while N˜ denotes national employment
levels. The predicted employment change in equation 35 captures the component of the 1980-
1990 and 1990-2001 local employment shock explained by the city’s industry mix in the base
year (1980 or 1990) interacted with the decadal (1980-1990 or 1990-2001) fate of industries at
the national level. The results indicate that for each job lost as a result of a demand shock in
a city, the public sector has created 0.194 jobs in the public sector in that city. This provides
direct evidence that public employment has been used as a prominent policy instrument to
offset local economic shocks. Note that these policy responses are important since they will bias
downwards the OLS estimates in the regressions (which we turn to next) that estimate the effect
of public employment on local private employment. As for the capital variable, the results of
this last specification are slightly higher, implying that capital cities gained 1.6 additional public
sector jobs per decade for every 100 inhabitants in the period 1980-2001.
27This variable will become the main explanatory variable in the next section when we turn to the multiplier
effects of public employment. Its summary statistics are provided in the third panel (last row) of Table 5.
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Table 8: The determinants of public sector job increases
(1) (2) (3)
Capital 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.016***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Population growth 0.036*** 0.042***
(0.007) (0.008)
Ep,t+10−Ep,t
Popt
-0.194***
(0.060)
R-squared 0.041 0.119 0.165
Observations 166 166 166
Notes: 1) 1980-1990 and 1990-2001 pooled observations 2) Robust
standard errors clustered at the city-level in parentheses. 3) *** de-
notes statistical significance at the 1% level. 4) Population growth is
the contemporaneous decadal population growth rate. 5) The last ex-
planatory variable, the private job changes’ predictor, as defined in
equation 35.
4.3 Public employment multipliers: OLS estimates
We now turn to the estimation of public sector employment multipliers. Specifically, we esti-
mate the impact of (decadal) changes in public employment on contemporaneous changes in
measures of employment and population. All employment and population changes are divided
by the city’s population level at the beginning of the decade. We run variants of the following
specification.
Yt+10−Yt
Popt
=µt +γ
Eg ,t+10−Eg ,t
Popt
+η xt +ζt , (36)
where Y stands for tradable, non-tradable and total employment, and active, working age,
and total population. In addition to the change in public employment (Eg ), the specification
includes time dummies (µt ), a vector containing control variables (xt ) and the error term (ζt ).
The results are reported in Table 9 where each row shows the effect of a public sector job increase
on a different outcome. The first column shows the results of specifications that only include the
time dummies as controls. In the second column, we also include the unemployment rate and
the share of college graduates measured at the beginning of the decade. Some of the cities in our
sample are fast-growing coastal cities associated with tourism, such as Torrevieja, Costa del Sol
or Tenerife Sur. Thus, in the third column we also include the share of vacation homes in 1991
as well as two coastal indicators: one for the North Atlantic coast (Mar Cantábrico) with less
tourism and one for the coasts of the Mediterranean, the Andalusian Atlantic and the Canaries
coasts. Finally, as commented previously, when describing the summary statistics in Table 5,
there is mean reversion in population growth. Hence, in column 4, we include a second order
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polynomial of the (logged) population level in 1970. The summary statistics for these controls
are provided in the bottom panel of Table 5.
Table 9: Public employment multipliers: OLS estimates
Outcomes: 1 2 3 4
a)Tradable employment 0.087 0.116* 0.101 0.102
(0.073) (0.060) (0.064) (0.064)
b) Non-tradable employment 0.545*** 0.649*** 0.602*** 0.614***
(0.156) (0.145) (0.134) (0.133)
c) Total employment 1.632*** 1.765*** 1.703*** 1.716***
(0.183) (0.164) (0.160) (0.160)
d) Active population 1.780*** 1.940*** 1.853*** 1.862***
(0.211) (0.185) (0.168) (0.169)
e) Working age population 0.938** 1.117*** 0.865*** 0.865***
(0.438) (0.421) (0.334) (0.295)
f) Population 1.679*** 1.875*** 1.447*** 1.458***
(0.573) (0.576) (0.456) (0.452)
Unemployment rate N Y Y Y
Share of college graduates N Y Y Y
Coastal dummies N N Y Y
Share of vacation-homes in 1991 N N Y Y
Logged pop in 1970 (2nd order pol.) N N N Y
N 166 166 166 166
Notes: 1) 1980-1990 and 1990-2001 pooled observations 2) Robust standard errors clustered at the city-
level in parentheses. 3) ***,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. 4) Un-
employment rate and share of college graduates measured at the beginning of the decade. 5) Coastal
dummies include two dummies: One for the North Atlantic coast (Cantábrico) and one for the coasts of
the Mediterranean, the Atlantic in Andalusia and the Canaries coasts.
Focusing on the last, and more complete, specification, the results indicate that public sector
jobs do not significantly increase nor decrease employment in the tradable sector. In contrast,
the results reported in the second row indicate that one additional job in the public sector cre-
ates more than 0.6 jobs in the non-tradable sector. The effect on total employment (third row)
is about 1.7 which includes the public job being created and the additional positive effect on
private employment. Across the different model specifications, the results do not undergo any
major changes. As for population, the results indicate that creating public sector jobs increases
the active, the working age and total population, suggesting that taking geographical mobility
into account might be important when assessing the local labor market effects of the expansion
of public employment.
As revealed by the analysis of the determinants of the expansion of the public sector in Table
8, the public sector used its job openings to offset negative private employment shocks. These
policy responses tend to underestimate the (OLS) coefficients presented in Table 9. On the other
hand, however, we have seen that cities that grow more hire more public employees (probably)
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to provide public services to a larger population. Since growing cities are likely to create more
private as well as public jobs, this will lead to a tendency to over-estimate the effect of public em-
ployment on private jobs. Hence, the estimates provided in this section may be either under- or
over-estimates of the effect of public sector expansions on private employment and population.
Thus, to circumvent these endogeneity concerns, we now turn to the TSLS analysis.
4.4 Public employment multipliers: TSLS estimates
We have seen above that Spain’s capital cities (as opposed to non-capital cities) experienced
larger increases in public sector employment as the public sector developed in the period 1980-
2001. This observation form the basis of the instrumental variables approach that we now adopt
which involves using the capital status of a city to instrument for changes in public employment
relative to the population level in the base year. Table 10 reports the TSLS estimates of equation
36 and shares the same structure as Table 9. That is, each row shows the public employment
coefficient on an employment or a population outcome. In terms of control variables, the first
column corresponds to the specification reported in the last column of Table 9. This baseline
specification includes time dummies, the unemployment rate and the share of college gradu-
ates at the beginning of the decade, the tourism variables (the coast indicators and the share of
vacation-homes in the city), and the 2nd order polynomial of the (logged) population level in
1970.
In the case of the second stage results, the tradable employment coefficient is not statisti-
cally different from zero although the point estimate is larger than its OLS counterpart. Jobs in
the non-tradable sector increase in a city when public sector jobs are created. Specifically, a new
job in the public sector creates about 1.1 jobs in the non-tradable sector. Considering the direct
jobs created in the public sector, the effect on total employment is about 2.3 (row c). The effects
on population are sizable, too. One job in the public sector increases the city’s labor force by 2.7
workers (row d) and the working age population by 4.4 (row e). Finally, the coefficient on total
population is around 6.4, indicating that city size is very responsive to the creation of public
sector jobs (row f). Note that the TSLS (positive) estimates of public employment on total em-
ployment and on population are larger than their corresponding OLS estimates. This suggests
that the latter are downwards biased and confounded by the strong policy responses consisting
in offsetting negative shocks in private employment by opening public sector jobs.
The effects of public employment on both private employment and on population are rela-
tively large, at least, compared to the results reported for England by Faggio and Overman (2014).
There are, at least, three factors that can account for the size of the multipliers that we estimate.
First, as explained above, interregional migration rates have been relatively low in Spain be-
tween 1980 and 2001 but, in contrast, intraregional migration rates have been substantial (Bover
and Arellano, 2001). Second, the model simulations indicate that land supply elasticity is key to
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Table 10: Public employment multipliers: TSLS estimates
1 2 3 4 5
a) Tradable employment 0.267 0.314 0.364 0.351 0.287
(0.294) (0.319) (0.337) (0.329) (0.314)
b) Non-tradable employment 1.078*** 1.259*** 1.404*** 0.861*** 1.020**
(0.415) (0.489) (0.449) (0.325) (0.416)
c) Total employment 2.344*** 2.573*** 2.769*** 2.129*** 2.307***
(0.571) (0.666) (0.638) (0.447) (0.588)
d) Active population 2.695*** 2.967*** 3.156*** - 2.667***
(0.672) (0.778) (0.713) (0.681)
e) Working age population 4.443*** 4.983*** 5.148*** - 4.265***
(1.463) (1.678) (1.510) (1.442)
f) Population 6.356*** 7.062*** 7.037*** 5.820*** 6.257***
(2.027) (2.357) (2.196) (2.174) (2.034)
Unemployment rate Y Y Y Y Y
Share of college graduates Y Y Y Y Y
Tourism variables Y Y Y Y Y
2nd order logged pop. polynomial Y Y Y Y Y
Weather N Y N N N
Regional fixed effects N N Y N N
Lagged dependent variable N N N Y N
Motorways N N N N Y
F-test of excluded instruments 15,750 15,160 15,010 - 14,340
N 166 166 166 166 166
Notes: 1) 1980-1990 and 1990-2001 pooled observations 2) Robust standard errors clustered at the city-level in
parentheses. 3) ***,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. 4) Unemployment rate and
share of college graduates measured at the beginning of the decade. 5) Coastal dummies include two dummies:
One for the North Atlantic coast (Cantábrico) and one for the coasts of the Mediterranean, the Atlantic in Andalusia
and the Canaries coasts. 6) Weather includes annual days of frost, hours of sun and rainfall. 7) Regional fixed effects
for the 7 NUTS1 Spanish regions. 8) The estimates for active population and working age population not shown
in the specification with lagged dependent variables as these outcomes are not available for 1970. For this spec-
ification, the F-statistic is not reported as for each outcome it takes a different value 9) Motorways is the decadal
contemporaneous increase in the number of motorway rays.
determining if, and the extent to which, public employment crowds-in or crowds-out private
employment. As can be seen in Figure 3, the complier cities in our TSLS regressions are rela-
tively small provincial capitals which can be considered to be cities with a rather elastic land
supply. Finally, the model simulations indicate that multipliers will be larger when public sector
wages are high. In Spain, the public sector wage gap is substantial (Hospido and Moral-Benito,
2014), and this is especially true in small provincial capitals given that the distribution of public
sector wages is more compressed than that of the private sector.
For the estimates in Table 10 to be reliable, the instrument used needs to be both relevant
and valid. In terms of relevance, the estimates in Table 8 indicate that, indeed, capital cities at-
tracted more public sector jobs. According to the results in the last column, capital cities gained
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1.6 additional public sector jobs per 100 inhabitants each decade in the period 1980-2001. To
assess instrument relevance more formally, at the bottom of Table 10, we report the F-test of ex-
cluded instruments. The value of the F-test, obtained in a regression where the standard errors
are clustered at the city-level, is 15.8 and corroborates that, indeed, the capital cities attracted
more public sector jobs. In fact, the instrument coefficient in the first stage regression is 0.017
which is very close to 0.016, the estimate obtained in the last specification of Table 8.
As for instrument validity, the identifying assumption is that, conditional on control vari-
ables, the capital status of a city is uncorrelated to unobserved shocks in employment and pop-
ulation decadal changes. As explained above, the provincial capitals were established in 1833
and, therefore, are clearly pre-determined with respect to our outcome variables. However, the
capital cities differ from non-capital cities in several respects. Capital cities have a lower un-
employment rate (the average unemployment rate -pooling 1981 and 1991- is 16.9 and 20.0 for
capital and non-capital cities) and a larger fraction of college graduates (the average share of
college graduates -pooling 1981 and 1991- is 9.7 and 5.8 for capital and non-capital cities). As
Figure 1 shows, capital cites are also less likely to be on the coasts of the Mediterranean and
Canaries’ coasts and, finally, capital cities are larger as can be readily seen in Figure 2. Although
including these controls had a modest impact on the OLS coefficients (see Table 9), their exclu-
sion does confound the TSLS estimates. Thus, our identifying assumption is that capital status
is uncorrelated to shocks in employment and population changes once we control for initial un-
employment, education, location (coast versus inland) and size. Note that these city features are
observables that confound our estimates when they are omitted as controls. Hence, there might
be city unobservables that are actually confounding our findings. In what follows, we address a
number of threats to identification.
In the US, weather has been an important determinant of city growth with cities in the sun
belt performing especially well, see e.g. (Rappaport, 2007). Thus, in column 2 of Table 10 we
include city-level weather controls. Specifically, we consider the city’s annual averages for days
of frost, hours of sun and rainfall28. The results remain unchanged indicating that a correlation
between weather and capital status is not confounding our estimates.
As explained above, capital cities are less likely to be on the coasts of the Mediterranean
and Canaries’ coasts. More generally, Figure 1 also reveals that while capitals are evenly dis-
tributed across Spain, non-capitals are concentrated in the east and the south-east. Since the
east has performed particularly well in the period of study, the results could be biased by the
fact that regions performing better have a higher proportion of non-capital cities. Thus, in col-
umn 3, we include dummies for the 7 (broad) NUTS1 Spanish regions29. The results, that exploit
28Agencia Estatal de Metereología. 1980-2010 averages. There are a handful of cities without a climate observa-
tory. For these cities, we impute the values of the closest observatory.
29North west: Galicia, Asturias and Cantabria; North East: Basque Country, Navarre, La Rioja, Aragon; Madrid;
Centre: Castile and Leon, Castile-la Mancha, Extremadura; East: Catalonia, Valencian Community and Balearic
Islands; South: Andalusia, Region of Murcia; Canary Islands.
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changes between cities within regions remain largely unchanged and indicate that regional spe-
cific trends in employment and population do not seem to be driving the results.
In column 4 we move to city-specific pre-treatment trends in employment and population.
Specifically, we include, as an additional control variable, the lagged dependent variable (1970-
1980 and 1980-1990 values for the 1980-1990 and 1990-2001 observations, respectively). Since
the active and the working-age population for 1970 are not available, we cannot estimate this
specification for rows d) and e). Reassuringly, our estimates do not undergo any significant
changes suggesting that our results are not driven by pre-existing city-specific time trends.
Finally, in the period that we study, Spain developed a large motorway network that has been
found to affect city growth, see, e.g. (Garcia-López (2012) and Garcia-López et al. (2015)). Since
the network might have provided better connections to capital cities, in column 5 we include, as
an additional control variable, the decadal contemporaneous increase in the number of motor-
way rays in the city30. The results suggest that the positive effects that we document from public
sector jobs on private employment and population do not capture higher infrastructure invest-
ments in capital cities. Overall, once we account for basic differences across cities in terms of
unemployment, education, location (coastal vs. non-coastal cities) and size, the results do not
seem to be sensitive to a number of robustness checks.
We conclude this section by comparing the estimated multipliers with those obtained when
simulating the search and matching model in section 3. According to the regressions, one addi-
tional public sector job increases private employment by about 1.3 and active population by 2.7.
The corresponding multipliers found in section 3 (Table 2) were about 1.3 and 2.6, respectively.
Admittedly, the multipliers for the tradable sector are less similar although not statistically dif-
ferent from each other. While the multiplier is -0.012 according to the simulated model, the
corresponding TSLS (point) estimate is 0.267. All in all, the empirical findings provided by the
two empirical approaches yield remarkably similar results and, thus, the two approaches cross-
check each other.
4.5 Do public sector jobs reduce local unemployment?
The regression results obtained above clearly indicate that public sector jobs do increase private
employment. However, they also show that population increases too and, thus, the effect on the
unemployment rate is not obvious. To assess the implied effects on the unemployment rate of
the estimates presented in Table 10, we take the average Spanish city in 2001 and assume that
public employment increases by 50%, which is the policy experiment that we have simulated
with the calibrated model in section 3. The findings are reported in Table 11.
Column 2 of Table 11 reproduces the estimated multipliers reported in the first column of
30Number of motorway rays in each city computed using the Mapa General de Carreteras - Ministerio de Fomento
from the years 1980, 1990 and 2001.
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Table 11: Local labor market effects of public sector job expansions
Variables Mean 2001 Multiplier New Equilibrium % Change
Total employment 119,700 2.344 154,262 28.874
Active population 141,829 2.695 181,567 28.018
Working age pop. 228,056 4.443 293,568 28.726
Population 330,320 6.356 424,039 28.372
Unemployment rate 0.156 0.150 -0.560a
Participation rate 0.622 0.618 -0.340a
Public employment 29,489 44,234 50.000
Notes: 1) The new equilibrium is the result of adding to the 2001 mean, the respective multiplier
times 14,745 (a 50% increase in public employment starting from 29,489 jobs). The last two columns
(shown for ease of comparison) show the baseline simulations reported in Table 2. 2) a are changes
expressed in percentage points.
Table 10. The new equilibrium is the result of adding to the 2001 mean, the respective multiplier
times 14,745, which is a 50% increase in public jobs for the average city in 2001. Increasing pub-
lic employment by 50% increases total employment by 28.9%. At the same time, however, the
active population grows at a similar rate (28.0%) and, as a result, the unemployment rate expe-
riences a slight decrease. Specifically, it only falls from 0.156 to 0.150. These results are, again,
very similar to those predicted by the simulations in section 3. In the baseline scenario (Table
2), increasing public employment by 50% increases total employment and active population by
27.8% and 26.7%, respectively, with the unemployment rate falling from 0.156 to 0.149.
The results presented in Table 11 also allow us to quantify the effects of public employment
on the working-age population. As explained above, an important trend in the Spanish labor
market in the period studied was the marked increase in female labor force participation. Our
estimated effects on the active and the working-age city-level populations suggest that this was
not the case. Specifically, public sector jobs increase the labor force and the working-age popu-
lation in similar proportions and, as a consequence, participation in the labor market remains
largely unaltered. All in all, migration (rather than labor-force participation) seems to be the
main margin through which local labor markets adjust to public sector job expansions.
5 Summary and final remarks
In this paper we have quantified the impact of public employment on Spanish local labor mar-
kets in the long-run by adopting two quantitative approaches. In the first, we developed a 3-
sector (public, tradable and non-tradable) search and matching model embedded within a spa-
tial equilibrium model in the spirit of Beaudry et al. (2012) and Kline and Moretti (2013). We
characterized the steady state of the model and calibrated it. We then used the model to sim-
ulate a policy consisting in expanding public sector employment in a city. To the best of our
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knowledge, we are the first to use a calibrated search and matching model to study the effect of
a local labor market policy in the context of open cities. Variants of the quantitative approach
developed here might be well suited for evaluating labor market and regional policies when local
unemployment is an important policy target or outcome of interest.
In the second approach, we have used regression analysis to estimate the impact of public
sector job growth on decadal changes (1980-1990 and 1990-2001) in the employment and pop-
ulation of Spanish cities. This analysis exploited the dramatic increase in public employment
in the period 1980-2001, following Franco’s death in 1975 and the advent of democracy in 1978.
We resorted to an instrumental variables approach that used the capital status of cities to in-
strument for changes in public sector employment.
The two empirical approaches yield qualitatively similar results and, thus, cross-check each
other. One additional public sector job creates about 1.3 extra jobs in the private sector. How-
ever, these new jobs do not translate into a substantial reduction in the local unemployment rate
as better labor market conditions attract new workers to the city. Increasing public employment
by 50% only reduces unemployment by o.6 percentage points (from 15.6 to 15%). An impor-
tant message to be derived from this paper is that taking geographical mobility into account
can be crucial for proper evaluation of the equity and efficiency of regional and local policies,
as emphasized by Kline and Moretti (2013) and Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008) when assessing the
rationale for place-based initiatives.
References
Albouy, D. (2009). “The Unequal Geographic Burden of Federal Taxation.” Journal of Political
Economy, 117(4), 635–667.
Alesina, A., Danninger, S., and Rostagno, M. (2001). “Redistribution Through Public Employ-
ment: The Case of Italy.” IMF Staff Papers, 48(3), 2–44.
Algan, Y., Cahuc, P., and Zylberberg, A. (2002). “Public employment and labour market perfor-
mance.” Economic Policy, 17(34), 7–66.
Andersson, R. (2005). “The efficiency of Swedish regional policy.” The Annals of Regional Science,
39(4), 811–832.
Bartik, T. J. (1991). Who Benefits from State and Local Economic Development Policies? No. wbsle
in Books from Upjohn Press, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Beaudry, P., Green, D. A., and Sand, B. (2012). “Does Industrial Composition Matter for Wages?
A Test of Search and Bargaining Theory.” Econometrica, 80(3), 1063–1104.
33
Borge, L.-E., and Matsen, E. (2004). “Public Employment and Regional Risk Sharing.” Scandina-
vian Journal of Economics, 106(2), 215–230.
Bover, O., and Arellano, M. (2001). “Learning about migration decisions from the migrants: Us-
ing complementary datasets to model intra-regional migrations in Spain.” Journal of Popula-
tion Economics, 15(2), 357–380.
Bradley, J., Postel-Vinay, F., and Turon, H. (2015). “Public Sector Wage Policy and Labor Market
Equilibrium: A Structural Model.” mimeo, University College London.
Burdett, K. (2012). “Towards a theory of the labor market with a public sector.” Labour Eco-
nomics, 19, 68–75.
Carrión-i Silvestre, J. L., Espasa, M., and Mora, T. (2008). “Fiscal Decentralization and Economic
Growth in Spain.” Public Finance Review, 36(2), 194–218.
Ciccone, A., and Hall, R. E. (1996). “Productivity and the Density of Economic Activity.” American
Economic Review, 86(1), 54–70.
Combes, P.-P., Duranton, G., and Gobillon, L. (2012). “The Costs of Agglomeration: Land Prices
in French Cities.” Discussion Papers 9240, CEPR.
Combes, P.-P., and Gobillon, L. (2015). “Chapter 5 - the empirics of agglomeration economies.” In
J. V. H. Gilles Duranton, and W. C. Strange (Eds.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics,
Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, vol. 5, 247 – 348, Elsevier.
Davis, M. A., and Ortalo-Magne, F. (2011). “Household Expenditures, Wages, Rents.” Review of
Economic Dynamics, 14(2), 248–261.
De la Roca, J., and Puga, D. (2013). “Learning By Working In Big Cities.” Working Papers 2013-
1301, CEMFI.
Diamond, P. A. (1982). “Wage determination and efficiency in search equilibrium.” The Review
of Economic Studies, 49(2), 217–227.
Faggio, G., and Overman, H. (2014). “The effect of public sector employment on local labour
markets.” Journal of Urban Economics, 79 - Spatial Dimensions of Labor Markets, 91–107.
Garcia-López, M.-A. (2012). “Urban spatial structure, suburbanization and transportation in
Barcelona.” Journal of Urban Economics, 72(2), 176–190.
Garcia-López, M.-A., Holl, A., and Viladecans-Marsal, E. (2015). “Suburbanization and high-
ways in Spain when the Romans and the Bourbons still shape its cities.” Journal of Urban
Economics, 85(C), 52–67.
34
Glaeser, E. L., and Gottlieb, J. D. (2008). “The Economics of Place-Making Policies.” Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 39(1 (Spring), 155–253.
Gomes, P. (2015a). “Heterogeneity and the public sector wage policy.” mimeo, Universidad Car-
los III.
Gomes, P. (2015b). “Optimal public sector wages.” The Economic Journal, 125(587), 1425–1451.
Hilber, C. A. L., and Vermeulen, W. (2015). “The impact of supply constraints on house prices in
england.” The Economic Journal, forthcoming.
Hospido, L., and Moral-Benito, E. (2014). “The Public Sector Wage Premium in Spain: Evidence
from Longitudinal Administrative Data.” Working Papers 1422, Banco de España.
Jofre-Monseny, J. (2014). “The effects of unemployment protection on migration in lagging re-
gions.” Journal of Urban Economics, 83, 73 – 86.
Kline, P., and Moretti, E. (2013). “Place Based Policies with Unemployment.” American Economic
Review, 103(3), 238–43.
Kraus, F., Puhani, P. A., and Steiner, V. (1998). “Do public works programs work? Some unpleas-
ant results from the East German experience.” Discussion Papers 98-07, ZEW-Centre for Eu-
ropean Economic Research.
Marqués-Sevillano, J. M., and Rosselló-Villallonga, J. (2004). “Public employment and regional
redistribution in spain.” Hacienda Pública Española, 170(3), 59–80.
Moretti, E. (2010). “Local multipliers.” American Economic Review, 100, 373–377.
Moretti, E. (2012). The New Geography of Jobs. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, New York.
Moretti, E., and Thulin, P. (2013). “Local multipliers and human capital in the united states and
sweden.” Industrial and Corporate Change, 22(1), 339–362.
Mortensen, D. T. (1982). “The Matching Process as a Noncooperative Bargaining Game.” In The
Economics of Information and Uncertainty, NBER Chapters, 233–258, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, Inc.
OECD (2015). Government at a Glance 2015. OECD Publishing.
Pissarides, C. A. (1985). “Short-run Equilibrium Dynamics of Unemployment Vacancies, and
Real Wages.” American Economic Review, 75(4), 676–90.
Pissarides, C. A. (2000). Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, 2nd Edition, MIT Press Books, vol. 1.
The MIT Press.
35
Pissarides, C. A., and Petrongolo, B. (2001). “Looking into the Black Box: A Survey of the Match-
ing Function.” Journal of Economic Literature, 39(2), 390–431.
Quadrini, V., and Trigari, A. (2007). “Public employment and the business cycle*.” The Scandi-
navian Journal of Economics, 109(4), 723–742.
Rappaport, J. (2007). “Moving to nice weather.” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 37(3),
375–398.
Roback, J. (1982). “Wages, rents, and the quality of life.” Journal of Political Economy, 90(6),
1257–1278.
Rosenthal, S. S., and Strange, W. C. (2008). “The attenuation of human capital spillovers.” Journal
of Urban Economics, 64(2), 373 – 389.
Silva, J. I., and Vázquez-Grenno, J. (2013). “The ins and outs of unemployment in a two-tier labor
market.” Labour Economics, 24(C), 161–169.
Wrede, M. (2015). “Wages, rents, unemployment, and the quality of life: A consistent theory-
based measure.” Journal of Regional Science, 55(4), 609–625.
36
A Appendix: Nash bargaining
A.1 Tradable sector
max
w
(Wt −U )β(Jt −Vt )1−β, (A-1)
r Vt = 0. (A-2)
Then the FOC’s
β(Wt −U )β−1 dWt
d wt
J 1−βt + (Wt −U )β(1−β)
d Jt
d wt
J−βt = 0, (A-3)
β(Wt −U )−1 dWt
d wt
Jt = (1−β) d Jt
d wt
, (A-4)
β
dWt
d wt
Jt = −(Wt −U )(1−β) d Jt
d wt
. (A-5)
From equations 3 and A-2:
Jt = At (L)−wt
r + st
, (A-6)
then,
d Jt
d wt
= −1
r + st
. (A-7)
Subtracting rU from both sides of equation 10
r (Wt −U ) = wt
P
+ st (U −Wt )− rU , (A-8)
operating,
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(Wt −U ) =
wt
P − rU
r + st
, (A-9)
then,
dWt
d wt
=
1
P
r + st
. (A-10)
Substituting equation A-7 and A-9 in A-5 we obtain equation 13,
1
P
βJt = (1−β)(Wt −U ). (A-11)
A.2 Non-tradable sector
max
w
(Wn −U )β(Jn −Vn)1−β, (A-12)
r Vn = 0, (A-13)
Then the FOC’s
β(Wn −U )β−1 dWn
d wn
J 1−βn + (Wn −U )β(1−β)
d Jn
d wn
J−βn = 0, (A-14)
β(Wn −U )−1 dWn
d wn
Jn = (1−β) d Jn
d wn
, (A-15)
β
dWn
d wn
Jn = −(Wn −U )(1−β) d Jn
d wn
, (A-16)
From equations 4 and A-13:
Jn = pn An −wn
r + sn
, (A-17)
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then,
d Jn
d wn
= −1
r + sn
. (A-18)
Subtracting rU from both sides of equation 11
r (Wn −U ) = wn
P
+ sn(U −Wn)− rU , (A-19)
operating,
(Wn −U ) =
wn
P − rU
r + sn
, (A-20)
then,
dWn
d wn
=
1
P
r + sn
. (A-21)
Substituting equation A-18 and A-20 in A-16 we obtain equation 14,
1
P
βJn = (1−β)(Wn −U ). (A-22)
B Appendix: Wage equations
To obtain the wage equations 24 and 25 we start using the first order conditions 22 and 23. Next,
we solve for Jt in 3 and Jn in 4
Jt = At (L)−wt
(r + st )
, (A-23)
Jn = pn An −wnt
(r + sn)
. (A-24)
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Notice that the job creation conditions 22 and 23 are obtained by using A-23, A-24, 1, 2 and
the free entry conditions 5 and 6.
Then, we solve for Wt −U and Wn −U in using 8, 10 and 11,
(Wt −U )=
wt
P − rU
(r + st )
, (A-25)
(Wn −U )=
wn
P − rU
(r + sn)
. (A-26)
Now substitute A-23, A-24, A-25 and A-26 in 13 and 14 and solve for wt and wn
wt =
(
βAt (L)
P
+ (1−β)rU
)
P, (A-27)
wn =
(
βpn An
P
+ (1−β)rU
)
P. (A-28)
To obtain rU we use equations 8, 22 and 23 and substitute Ji = kiq(θ) in 13 and 14,
(Wt −U )= β
(1−β)
kt
q(θ)P
, (A-29)
(Wn −U )= β
(1−β)
kn
q(θ)P
. (A-30)
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Next, we obtain Wg −U using 8 and 9
(Wg −U )=
(wg−b)
P − ft (Wt −U )− fn(Wn −U )
(r + sg + fg )
. (A-31)
Finally, knowing that fq(θ) = θ, we substitute A-29, A-30 and A-31 in 8 and obtain
rU = 1
P
b+ fg
 (wg −b− βθ(1−β) (Ωt kt +Ωnkn))
(r + sg + fg )
+ βθ
(1−β) (Ωt kt +Ωnkn)
 . (A-32)
By substituting A-32 into A-27 and A-28 we obtain the wage equations 24 and 25.
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